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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, * case No 
14242 
-vs- : 
RAYMOND GLENN DODGE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of the 
crime of Aggravated Robbery. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury which found the 
appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime 
of Aggravated Robbery. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an Order of this Court affirming 
the judgment and sentence rendered by the Court below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Shortly after midnight June 11, 1975 a 
man took approximately $58 0.00 at gunpoint from 
Rhea Selvadge, a cashier at the Ming Restaurant located 
in Granger. At trial, Mrs. Selvadge positively 
identified this robber as Lawrence Morgan, appellant's 
co-defendant at trial (T.8). Mrs. Selvadge further 
testified that during the course of the robbery 
a second man came up to the cash register, told the 
first man to hurry, and aided him in carrying the 
money from the store (T.10). Mrs. Selvadge was unable 
to give a positive identification of the second 
individual, but was able to give a description (T.10-12). 
As the two men fled the scene, Donna Shortino, a 
waitress at the Ming Restaurant, and Ned Frandson, 
an off-duty Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff, ran into 
the parking lot in time to observe a car leave. 
Miss Shortino described the car as a gold sedan (T.43). 
Officer Frandson described the vehicle as a gold or 
brown medium sized car with square tail lights, either 
a Ford Fairlane, Plymouth Duster, or Dodge Dart 
(T.53). Both witnesses testified that the car headed 
v/est from the restaurant which is located at 35th South 
and 20th West (T.47,55). Officer Frandson attempted 
to follow the car but was unsuccessful. Two witnesses 
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who had observed the gold car leave the parking lot 
informed Officer Frandson that the car contained 
three occupants; two males, whom they described, and 
a female (T.54,56,119). Of ficer Frandson broadcast 
this information over his car radio at 12:18 a.m. 
(T.54,137). 
At 12:25 a.m. Officer Twitchell observed 
a new gold Duster headed north on 27th West at 
approximately 22nd South (T.62,137). He followed 
the car and beamed a spotlight into it in order to 
observe the occupants. After Officer Twitchell had 
determined that there were three occupants, two 
males who matched the descriptions broadcast and 
a female, he stopped the car and ordered the individuals 
to leave the vehicle. After the suspects left the 
car, the officer discovered a pistol similar to 
the one used in the robbery. At this point, all 
three individuals were arrested and the search incident 
to that arrest uncovered a pair of gloves in the 
rear seat of the car, and approximately $580.00 in 
cash, checks and IOUfs in a purse inside the car 
(T.66,80). Mrs. Selvadge testified that the gloves 
and the pistol were similar to those used at the 
robbery, and positively identified an IOU as one taken 
from the cash register (T.11,12). Lawrence Morgan, 
who was identified by Mrs. Selvadge as one of the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
robbers, was the driver of the vehicle stopped by 
Officer Twitchell. Appellant was riding in the rear 
seat (T.63). 
At the trial of this case, on motion of 
appellant's counsel, the rule excluding witnesses 
from the courtroom was invoked, and the witnesses 
were admonished not to discuss their testimony with 
anyone except counsel (T.6-7). During the noon 
recess, the State's attorney questioned several 
of the witnesses as a group. Appellant moved for 
a mistrial on the grounds of the witnesses' mis-
conduct, and the trial court denied the motion 
(T.35,196). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING • 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR ARREST OF 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
At the trial of this case, the State intro-
duced direct testimony that established an Aggravated 
Robbery was committed by an armed individual at the 
time and place in question. The State introduced 
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further direct testimony that a second male individual 
assisted in the robbery. This second individual is 
clearly guilty of Aggravated Robbery under the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (Supp. 1975) 
which provides that: 
"Every person. . . who directly 
commits the offense. . . or in-
tentionally aids another person 
to engage in conduct which con-
stitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct." 
The State produced no direct evidence that 
established appellant's identity as the second 
individual involved in the robbery, but a wealth 
of circumstantial evidence was produced to establish 
appellant's identity as the guilty party. In State 
v. Schad, 24 U.2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970), this Court 
reaffirmed the proposition that a conviction can be 
had on circumstantial evidence if it excludes 
every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the 
defendant. The court went on to state that: 
"Unless upon our review of the 
evidence, and the reasonable in-
ferences fairly to be deduced there-
from, it appears that there was no 
reasonable basis therein for such 
a conclusion, we should not overturn 
the verdict." 24 Utah 2d at 257. 
_£ 
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The testimony offered in behalf of the 
State, if believed by the jury, would establish 
the following: Two male individuals committed 
an Aggravated Robbery, and fled the scene in the 
company of a woman in a gold colored, Duster-like 
car. Within a few moments and a few blocks of the 
crime, the appellant was found in a gold Duster in 
the company of one individual postively identified 
as the armed robber/and a woman. The car contained 
a gun and a pair of gloves similar to the ones used 
at the robbery, money in an amount similar to that 
taken at the robbery, and an IOU positively identified 
as having been seized at the time of the crime. 
Appellant has not suggested any reasonable hypothesis 
consistent with the above facts and the inferences 
fairly to be drawn from them other than appellantfs 
guilt. Surveying the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, it cannot be said 
that a reasonable jury would necessarily entertain some 
substantial doubt of appellant's guilt. It is not 
error to deny a motion for a new trial if there is 
sufficient evidence from which a jury might find a 
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defendant guilty. State v.. BeBee, 113 U. ,398, 195 
P.2d 746 (1948). The jury's verdict was amply supported 
by the evidence, and respondent respectfully submits 
that the trial court committed no error in denying 
appellantfs motions. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR AN ARREST 
OF JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION 
OF THE RULE EXCLUDING WITNESSES OR AN ADMONITION 
IMPOSED BY THE COURT 
At the beginning of trial, on motion of 
appellant's counsel, the trial court placed all 
witnesses under the rule excluding them from the 
courtroom, and admonished the witnesses not to 
discuss the case with anyone but counsel (T.7). 
During the noon recess, the State's attorney inter-
viewed several witnesses as a group. Appellant 
made a motion for a mistrial on the ground that 
this conduct was in violation of the courts admonition. 
Appellant made no motion to strike or exclude the 
violating witnesses' testimonies, nor did he request 
the court to instruct the jury that the violation 
of the admonition was a factor to be considered in 
determining the witnesses1 credibility. Appellant's counsel 
in all candor conceded that he could not show prejudice Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to his client by reason of the out-of-court dis-
cussion. 
It is in the first instance doubtful whether 
this conduct on the part of the v/itnesses was a 
violation of the admonition of the Court. The 
State's attorney did not consider the admonition 
to have been violated, and his view was entirely 
reasonable considering that discussions with 
counsel were specifically excepted. Even appellant's 
attorney admitted that the discussion was not an 
intentional violation of the rule (T.3 6).. It is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court 
to determine if an admonition not to discuss 
testimony has in fact been violated. Gomez v. 
People, 115 Colo. 507, 395 P.2d 462 (1964). 
Assuming that the prosecution's witnesses 
did violate the admonition, enforcement of the rule 
is also committed to the court's discretion. State 
v. Bergen, 13 Wash. App. 974, 538 P.2d 533 (1975). 
Failure of the appellant to avail himself of less 
drastic means of limiting the possible prejudice 
to himself does not warrant the granting of a 
new trial. In any event, as the discussions 
have already occurred, it is unlikely that a new 
trial would be any less prejudicial to appellant. 
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There is no just reason to grant appellantfs 
request for a new trial unless there is a showing 
that he has been prejudiced in his right to a 
fair trial. Appellant has contended that he should 
not be required to meet this burden because it is 
too difficult, and would require a detailed knowledge 
of the offending discussions. This is not the 
case. First, prejudice can be shown if any 
witnesses were to testify in a manner not anticipatedr 
or if the subject matter of the testimony was such 
that a comparison of the stories would be damaging. 
Neither of these factors were present in the case. 
Each witness testified consistently with prior 
statements, and the subject matter of their testimony 
did not lend itself to dovetailing. Before a new 
trial should be granted, it is surely more fair to 
require appellant to demonstrate that he has been 
damaged, than to cast upon the State the impossible 
burden of proving the absence of prejudice. 
In the case of State v. Carlsen, 25 U.2d 
305, 480 P.2d 736 (1971) this court held that 
the failure of the court to admonish witnesses not 
to discuss their testimonies was not reversible error 
-9-
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because,, inter alia, "there is no indication as to how 
whatever may have been discussed (which is not shown 
except in generality) would have had any adverse 
affect upon the defendant." 25 U.2d at 309. In the 
recent case of State v. Vaughn, 554 P.2d 210 (Utah 
1976), this court stated that: 
11
. • . whether the exclusion rule 
has been violated is within the 
sound discretion of the trial 
court and that to declare a mis-
trial, the onus is on the accused 
to demonstrate that he has been 
prejudiced," 554 P.2d at 212 
Respondent submits that appellant is not 
entitled to a new trial because of a questionable 
violation that has resulted in no demonstrable 
prejudice, 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the appellant was in 
all respects given a fair trial, and that the ver-
dict was in accord with the weight of the evidence. 
In the interest of justice, respondent asks that 
the verdict and judgment below be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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